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Conflict Analysis - Yemen

  • Writer: Simon Cook
    Simon Cook
  • Jan 28, 2022
  • 6 min read

Updated: Sep 3, 2023

This conflict analysis gives an overview of the many-layered Yemeni conflict. It explores the origins and impacts of the conflict through analysis of historical, sociopolitical, and economic dynamics. A summary is provided of the division of North / South Yemen, the uprising of Houthi rebels and interference by external actors, examining the actions and motivations of all parties. Crucially, it also touches upon the disintegration of Yemeni society caused by the multifaceted conflict, including mass internal displacement and enduring obstacles to peace.


Context

War erupted in Yemen in 2014, became internationalised in 2015 and has killed nearly 400,000 people (UNDP 2021). A divided country, Yemen is populated by competing groups with differing visions for ‘their’ land and their place within it. The Houthi ‘birthright’ to rise up against corruption and a desire for Southern secession are some of the stated motivations. As much as these elites differ in ideology, they align in their desire for power and resources.


Longstanding conflict between Northerners and Southerners was ostensibly resolved through unification of the Yemen Arabic Republic (YAR) and People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) into the Republic of Yemen (ROY) in 1990. Months later, Iraq invaded Kuwait, prompting the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to request US military intervention. President Ali Abdullah Saleh opposed this which led to Yemen being punished with cessation of financial support and expulsion of Yemeni nationals. This critically wounded the economy, leading to civil war in 1994 where Southern Separatists sought secession. Though Saleh prevailed, tensions persisted and the unity remained fragile (Lackner 2017).


Anti-government protests in 2010 grew into widespread demonstrations in 2011 demanding that Saleh, president of 32 years, step down. Violent reprisals triggered mass defections and clashes between rival groups as the protests became more politicised. A subsequent initiative by the GCC to transfer power and bring reform was critically undermined by; obstructive processes and actors, lacklustre international support, and infamous inadequacies in President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi’s ‘unity government’. The Houthi advance (enabled by widespread disillusionment and an unlikely alliance with one-time rival Saleh), eventually took the capital, Sana’a in June 2014. Hadi escaped to Saudi Arabia in early 2015 and shortly thereafter, officially requested the GCC’s help to reinstate him. Airstrikes by a Saudi-led military coalition commenced 2 days later (Lackner 2017).


GCC states such as Saudi Arabia and UAE (and their international allies) now intervene in Yemen, waging an arm’s length war with adversaries who they perceive to threaten their way of life (Iran, Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qa’ida). Since 2015, the Houthi advance continues against key government strongholds, with increasing cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia and UAE. Coalition airstrikes target Sana’a once more by way of response with a sharp intensification of fighting. All parties stand accused of committing war crimes, further harming civilians, driving displacement and destroying crucial infrastructure (Darwich 2018).


Main Actors

Houthis / Ansar Allah - a revolutionary political group. Their incarnation of Islam is expressly political, embedded in their Zaydi (minority Shi’a sect) identity as justly rebelling against corrupt oppressors. The Houthis’ relentless advance (and increasingly international reach) makes them the main threat to the internationally recognised government (backed by Sunni-ruled GCC states). As fellows in the minority Shi’a Islam of the Middle East, Iran funds the Houthis, supplies them with increasingly sophisticated weaponry and formally recognises the Supreme Political Council as the official government (Clausen 2018).


President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and his internationally recognised government - incumbent since 2012, Hadi and his government are predominantly based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Hadi clings onto power but faces big questions about legitimacy and the balance of power with dominant backer Saudi Arabia. In 2020, Hadi bowed to Saudi pressure, appointing a new government seeking to reconcile his supporters with the UAE-backed Southern Separatists (Southern Transitional Council - STC), uniting them against the Houthis (Al Jazeera 2020).


Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (particularly Saudi Arabia & UAE) - Saudi want to preserve free passage of oil through the Bab al-Mandab strait and counter Iran’s potentially expanding regional influence. UAE vehemently oppose the Muslim Brotherhood (closely associated with al-Islah; largest Yemeni Islamist party). Both are keen to protect themselves against al-Qa’ida (Lackner 2017). The GCC supports Hadi’s government with airstrikes, weaponry, finances and international diplomacy. Whilst not part of the Saudi-led coalition, Oman are almost universally praised as a mediator and are actively seeking peace. Despite outward impartiality, Oman also demonstrate unofficial support for the Houthis (Al-Madhaji 2021).


Western States (US, UK, France) - interests in Yemen include trade, investment and counter-terrorism. They provide assistance to Saudi and others through; arms sales, refuelling of aircraft, military training, intelligence and tactical support. They also hold great sway internationally in terms of a hesitancy towards peacebuilding given their reliance on the surrounding autocracies that would be challenged by such a transition (Lackner 2017).



Map of Yemen
Photo by Lara Jameson


Causes

Structural causes of the conflict relate to power struggles between competing groups in the North and South of Yemen, together with external actors’ disproportionate influence. These struggles arise from desire for self-governance (albeit expressed differently, i.e. Zaydi nationalism in the North and secessionism in the South). Patronage systems and the nepotism of ruling elites who exploit and misappropriate Yemen’s wealth (and limited natural resources) has become commonplace. This factor reacts explosively with the Houthis’ identification with their Zaydi ‘birthright’ to rise up against corrupt rulers (Clausen 2018). Alongside national divides, Yemen has historically been looked down upon by other Gulf states, an isolation exacerbated by their stance on the Iraq-Kuwait invasion (Darwich 2018). Yemen has also historically been seen as ripe for occupation with its strategic proximity to trade routes / other nations (Lackner 2017).


Proximate causes of the conflict in Yemen include intensification of anti-government protests in 2010 and the ensuing escalation. President Saleh enraged protesters (emboldened by the Arab Spring) by attempting to hold onto power unconstitutionally. Violent reprisals in March 2011 triggered mass defections in the military and elsewhere, politicising the protests and leading to clashes. In April 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative was signed to effect the transfer of power. However, the transition was critically undermined by; division, flawed processes, weak international support, and ineffective governance under President Hadi’s rule. Houthis advanced, taking the capital Sana’a in June 2014 (enabled by Saleh’s support and the exasperation of Yemenis impoverished by Structural Adjustment policies). Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia and, in March 2015, officially requested the GCC’s help to reinstate him. Saudi-coalition airstrikes commenced 2 days later (Lackner 2017).


Dynamics Matrix

​

Security

Political

Economic

Social

Global

​Western states (including UK) continue to support coalition. US has officially ended support for ‘offensive operations’. Yemen’s ailing health system is incapable of treating and containing COVID-19. Medical centres are frequently targeted and closed, with many medics having fled.

Western nations’ prioritise relationships with GCC states (and profiteering from arms sales) rather than seeking an end to war.


The closure of a war crimes investigations body (following heavy Saudi lobbying), resulted in a sharp escalation in fighting.


Development aid lacking due to reduced and unmet pledges (from UN High-Level Pledging Event - Feb 2019) and lack of functioning government to ensure aid distribution.


Western nations see GCC states as sources of investment and trade (i.e. huge arms sales; used in conflict) at a time of domestic economic challenge.


The world’s attention was briefly turned to advocate against Western support for the Saudi-led coalition when starving Yemeni children pictured in the New York Times trended on social media, (not long after Jamal Khashoggi was assassinated).

Regional / Cross-border

Recent escalation of Saudi-led coalition airstrikes and cross-border attacks from Houthis (notably against UAE - Jan 2022). Israel have offered UAE security and intelligence support.


Oman continues quiet diplomacy, advocating for peace by providing Houthis space to engage diplomatically with key actors.


International community’s inconsistent peacebuilding support is largely due to concern of aggravating the autocracies of neighbouring nations.

Saudi’s ongoing financial and military support to the government was likely predicated upon Hadi’s acceptance of newly formed Saudi-backed government.

The regional Shia-Sunni power struggle strongly underlies the conflict, a conveniently distant setting for the Saudi-led coalition to conduct a proxy war with ideological opponents in an existential battle for survival.

National

The lack of an effective national government makes it impossible to implement any particular security agenda.


Saudi blockade of Hudaydah port and closure of Sana’a airport (perpetrator disputed) prevent humanitarian aid from reaching those most in need.


The questions of legitimacy of rule and efficacy of the ‘national’ government hang over Hadi’s administration given majority of the population inhabit Houthi-controlled areas.

Widespread profiteering from illegal trade weakens rival leaders’ motivation to pursue peace as fighters need to sustain their families despite Yemen’s broken economy.

Widespread profiteering from illegal trade weakens rival leaders’ motivation to pursue peace as fighters need to sustain their families despite Yemen’s broken economy.

Local

UAE provide weaponry, training and funding to Southern militias accused of war crimes (including; ‘The Giants’, the Security Belt and Elite Forces).

STC hold swathes of the South and are now represented in government, opposing the Houthis.

Blockade of Hudaydah port (crucial for food and trade). Air land and sea blockade of Sana’a and North (by Saudi-led coalition).

IDPs’ uneven distribution leads to unequal pressure on certain areas. Over 60% live in government-controlled territory, the rest in Houthi-controlled territory (UNOCHA 2021).


Limitations

This analysis is a vast oversimplification of very complex and nuanced issues. With Yemen in particular, it is a challenge to clearly capture the impact of many different interested parties with competing (and interconnected) agendas. For example, little reference is made to the influence of Islamist parties and their affiliations or how the idiosyncratic worldview of the Houthis has been able to advance so far. Also, some important global issues which have a very real bearing on the conflict, (such as climate change), have not been covered.


This document is not truly ‘live’ due to the ever-changing conflict and it has been harder to find detailed, impartial, recent information about developments in Yemeni politics. Recent developments may sometimes be assigned disproportionate significance due to their proximity and there is often a ‘benefit of hindsight’ when reflecting upon more historical facts.


Finally, it is a great loss that the voice of Yemeni citizens (especially women, minority groups and young people) is insufficiently represented in this analysis. Social media brings some democratisation to the available perspectives but, as usual, it’s elite groups and technocrats whose voices are loudest. This contributes to some very biased information sources. I agree with O’Gorman’s view (2011) that such analysis could instead be wielded as a tool of “social justice and transformation” through meaningful engagement with conflict-affected communities. Connected with this are the limitations of authors’ (and my own) Western worldview; a lack of cross-cultural understanding which significantly affects our framing of events and dynamics.




References

  • Al Jazeera, 2020. New Yemen gov’t sworn in after Saudi-brokered power-sharing deal. [Online], 26 Dec. Available from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/26/yemens-new-government-sworn-in-after-power-sharing-agreement [Accessed 22/01/2022].

  • Al-Madhaji, M., 2021. What is Muscat Doing in Yemen?. Sana’a Centre for Strategic Studies [Online], 14 Jun. Available from: https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/14390 [Accessed 24/01/2022].

  • Clausen, M., 2018. ‘Competing for Control over the State: The Case of Yemen’. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29(3), pp.560-578.

  • Darwich, M., 2018. ‘The Saudi Intervention in Yemen: Struggling for Status’. Insight Turkey, 20(2), pp.125-42.

  • Lackner, H., 2017. Yemen in Crisis: Autocracy, Neo-Liberalism and the Disintegration of a State, Saqi Books. London.

  • O’Gorman, E., 2011. Conflict and Development, Zed Books. London

  • UNDP, 2021, ‘Assessing The Impact of War in Yemen: Pathways for Recovery’, UNDP.

  • UNHCR Refugee Data Finder, 2022. Yemen - Global Focus. [Online], 23 Jan. Available from: https://reporting.unhcr.org/yemen#:~:text=At%20the%20end%20of%202020,crisis%20due%20to%20conflict%20worldwide [Accessed 23/01/2022].

  • UNOCHA, 2021, ‘Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021’, UNOCHA.


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