Human Rights, Culture and Empire

A critical analysis of the relationship between human rights, culture and empire. This work explores the universality of human rights in the context of historical colonialism, cultural hierarchy and biassed tolerance of cultural practices. Cases of Western military intervention are studied to highlight the hypocrisy of alternately weaponising and rejecting the human rights regime according to neo-colonial aims. Recommendations are made for Western powers to facilitate a multicultural, inclusive and collaborative development of human rights that upholds the dignity of all people.

Introduction

The establishment of the human rights regime did not occur in a vacuum but within a complex global system of conflict, atrocities and colonialism. Despite the stated aim of protecting people, since the creation of the human rights instruments there has been deliberate and unconscious imposition of a system of human rights upon different nations and cultures. In this essay I will explore whether human rights really are as universal as their proponents claim or if, in fact, dogmatic pursuit of their adoption worldwide actually constitutes a new form of colonialism. We will see that if human rights cannot be completely universally applied then the implication is that some practices must be tolerated due to cultural difference. Disturbingly, those cultures to whom tolerance must be shown often starkly favours powerful, Western, liberal societies implying a cultural hierarchy where some nations are deemed more civilised and advanced than others. I will use the example of America’s objection to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to illustrate the hypocrisy of Western powers’ alternating weaponisation and rejection of human rights. I will then use the American invasion of Afghanistan as an example of how human rights can be used to justify neo-colonial military interventions in sovereign nations. Such incursions are often framed as quests for democracy and emancipation of vulnerable groups through forceful advancement of human rights. Looking at Mutua’s work (2001), I will explore how engagement from non-Western nations with the human rights regime can be inhibited by the framework and processes involved, reinforcing global inequalities and thereby neo-colonialism. Furthermore, as Evans (2005) notes, Western policies such as economic liberalism may be imposed by international actors in the guise of human rights in efforts to manipulate and control sovereign states’ economies for their own benefit. Tragically, the hegemonic, neo-colonial view is that ‘problematic’ cultures (those not conforming to Western, liberal ideals) require their unruly societies to be ‘civilised’ (made more manageable) through the imposition of the human rights regime.

Cultural Relativism versus Universalism

Human rights are intended to be universal and yet a debate continues to rage between universalist claims about rights and cultural relativism. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948), by definition, outlined the universal rights deemed (by the authors) to be applicable to all people in all societies, regardless of context. However, many have contested this understanding of human rights, not least the American Anthropological Association (AAA). In 1947 the AAA made a statement (AAA 1947) to contribute to the drafting of the UDHR which challenged the priority given to individual rights as compared to group or cultural rights. They argued that individuals are inextricably bound to their culture and therefore these rights were just as worthy of protection. They also argued that values and social norms are determined by the culture in which they originate and therefore such infinite cultural variation can not be judged by ‘universal standards’. They also restated this in their updated 1999 statement (AAA 1999). These statements can be seen as an expression of cultural relativism, a problematic issue for universalist claims (Engle 2001). The AAA have tried to reconcile this conflict by defining the protection of different cultures as a human right.

Many have questioned whether it is even possible to formulate a set of universal moral values, applicable to all people in all settings (Perry 1997). However, if one were to accept that individual human rights truly are universal, this then raises the question of whether that justifies their forceful imposition upon different nations and cultures (thereby compromising cultural or group rights). Such a course of action would appear to be thinly-veiled imperialism which seeks to subdue ‘unruly’ peoples, dressed up as a moral crusade. Donnelly (1984) asserts that the right to self-determination is a robust argument against such meddling by external actors in the name of ‘universal’ human rights. However, he does point out that those who rebut the imposition of ‘western’ human rights may themselves be westernised, repressive elites with limited ties to native culture, manipulating the narrative for selfish gain.

Those who would argue in favour of respect for cultural difference and cultural relativism assert that human rights can not be applied with equal vigour across all contexts. By implication this highlights the necessity for tolerance of different cultural values and practices (Dahre 2017). Where the UDHR asserted that cultural and other factors were not important when determining a person’s freedom or rights, the AAA explicitly argued against this. They asserted that culture in fact defines a person’s freedom (Dahre 2017). However, where tolerance towards differing cultures and practices is called for, this begs the question as to what limits such tolerance should have. For example, if our tolerance of different values and practices is infinite then this would most likely lead to the international community becoming complicit bystanders to awful atrocities and human suffering. Despite valid concerns about imperialism, this would also be an unacceptable approach to worldwide human rights. The so-called ‘Nazi Germany’ paragraph of the AAA 1947 statement sought to address such a concern. This paragraph is seen by many as a form of ‘get out clause’ in their rebuttal of universalistic human rights (given the recent history of Naziism and the Holocaust). However, Steward (1948) points out that this is a slippery slope and it’s all but impossible to draw a line defining what can and can not be tolerated. In his view, either the international community never intervenes in the activities of a sovereign nation or we combat oppression and injustice wherever it may be found. It seems that it is challenging to find a satisfactory middle ground between a human rights regime which respects culture and one which rides roughshod over it with imperialist aims. This jarring paragraph in the AAA 1947 statement flies in the face of their argument for cultural relativism, risking completely undermining their call for respect and tolerance of cultural difference. The paragraph says that where governments are denying their people’s rights or seeking to conquer others, then their citizens should be empowered to rise up against this. This view becomes most problematic in practice, seemingly sanctioning the international community to intervene forcefully (albeit to protect people’s rights), even when that means contravening a nation’s sovereignty. The key question here then, as Steward (1948) alludes to, is who gets to decide whether there has been sufficient discrimination or oppression in a given situation to warrant intervention. Western powers are usually favoured as decision makers and so we must be mindful of bias towards Western, liberal ideals and imperial goals that appropriate but fall outside of human rights concerns. Furthermore, when it is determined that intervention is required, what form is necessary to enforce the required ‘brake’ and how should this be determined? The many dilemmas, quagmires and failures of such a process is well highlighted by the UN Security Council’s frequent inability to effectively implement ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) due to the elusive unanimous approval required.

Engle (2001) points out a further challenge for cultural relativism in relation to human rights; that there may be differing views about what constitutes any given nation’s culture. Whilst citizens or especially marginalised groups may assert a particular claim, political elites may likely disagree. This then raises the question of what the international community should do when those within a culture are not aligned on the definition of their culture? All of which is complicated by the colonial mindset rife with dehumanisation and misconceptions about the homogeneity of cultures and peoples. Engle Merry (2001) warns us of the dangers of essentialising people and cultures in human rights when they are in fact complex and dynamic. Kymlicka’s work on state-minority rights (2011), exploring differences between the recognition of the rights of indigenous people and minorities, further emphasises the heterogeneity of nations and the multiplicity of cultures within. Such complexity and nuance highlights the risk of problematically universalising diverse groups of people when attempting to define cultures, ironically for the purpose of recognising and respecting cultural difference. Furthermore, Mutua (2001) reminds us how caricaturing the hegemonic human rights discourse can be. Brown (2004) asserts that we must therefore be mindful of how inadvertently damaging such discourse can be to people’s rights and freedoms. There is therefore a crucial need to resist the Western, imperialist tendency to subdue diverse, complex cultures through forceful imposition of the human rights regime.

Inherent in the recognition that an element of cultural tolerance is required regarding human rights, is that the ‘universal’ human rights are not fully reflective of all cultures. There have been many criticisms that human rights are implicitly Western-centric and therefore a form of neo-colonialism. Indeed, the AAA 1947 statement questioned how the UDHR could truly be applicable to all people when its origins were within the values of the West. Dahre (2017) notes that the statement warned the UN against an ‘excessively unilateral Western individualistic focus’. Mutua (2001) points out that the human rights regime found its conception in the establishment of the modern European state. He asserts that the concentration of power and resource (wielded with great violence in the hands of the state) resulted in the evolution of human rights to provide protection from the state. Consolidating its European origins, the establishment of the UDHR chiefly gave dominant Western states the power to define so-called ‘universal’ human rights. Mutua (2001) highlights that the human rights movement cannot afford to remain so Eurocentric, marginalising other nations and cultures. He argues that, in its current form, the human rights regime will fail due to its ‘foreignness’ to non-Western cultures. Such lack of relatability and inaccessibility implicitly means that, for all except westernised elites, human rights feel forcefully imposed.

The AAA 1947 statement also pinpointed a particular concern for exponents of cultural relativism, that it is not possible (or desirable) to objectively compare cultures. Such an exercise may be attempted with the aim of understanding which culture is superior or to establish a ‘cultural hierarchy’. The AAA’s assertion came with a heavy backdrop of recent and ongoing colonialism in developing nations, borne from the view that the culture of those who were colonised was fundamentally subordinate to their colonisers.

We have explored some of the debates around cultural relativism versus universalism including the limits of cultural tolerance, the problematic ‘universalising’ of diverse groups of people, the Western-centric nature of human rights and associated cultural hierarchies. I will now examine America’s objection to the ICC to highlight how Western powers can appropriate and subvert human rights to suit their own imperialist goals.

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The ‘Imperial Escape Clause’

As we’ve seen, if the origins and focus of the human rights regime are inextricably Western-centric then it would also follow that calls for tolerance of certain breaches demonstrate bias and blind spots. This is a theme we can see in America’s engagement with international human rights. The United States sought to build an international coalition in support of their invasion of Afghanistan using rhetoric around defence of human rights. Indeed President Bush repeatedly said ‘Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’ (Bush, G. W., 2001). The United States persisted in presenting their opponents in international campaigns as criminals who breach universal moral standards, justifying any and all means of defence (including military intervention). In this way, the United States championed a ‘policing’, interventionist approach to international relations (Douzinas 2003). In line with this, they were also great advocates for Kosovo and Rwanda war crime tribunals. However, when it came to establishing a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC), the United States argued vehemently against its universal jurisdiction. Their big fear was that prosecutions which are politically motivated may be brought against US soldiers involved in foreign military interventions. Attempts were made to assuage America’s objections and so the treaty of Rome significantly reduced the power and independence of the ICC, however, it was still possible for American soldiers to face prosecution (Douzinas 2003). Lacking this guarantee, America inauspiciously joined the ‘usual suspects’ of China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar, and Yemen by voting against the treaty (UN 2022). Three years later, the United States went further and voted into law the so-called ‘Hague Invasion Act’ authorising the President to use ‘all means necessary’ to free US soldiers imprisoned by the ICC (US Government 2001). It is implicit in their rejection of the ICC that the United States recognises their international military interventions will result in people’s human rights being breached. Douzinas (2003) calls America’s opposition to the ICC cultural relativism whereby it seeks to absolve itself of human rights abuses in the form of an ‘imperial escape clause’. There is a stark hypocrisy in waging war in the name of human rights breaches, whilst being unwilling to submit to international law when your own nation is the perpetrator. What is revealed is that the West is less passionate about upholding human rights and democratisation than they are obsessed with their imperialist desire to ‘civilise’ unruly cultures through force.

Imperialist Interventionism in the Guise of Human Rights

I will turn now to examine how the cause of human rights can sometimes be invoked to justify neo-colonial interventionism. In the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks, the United States led an invasion of Afghanistan to destroy al-Qaeda and remove the Taliban regime. However, the public discourse regarding this intervention was heavily influenced by endorsement from Laura Bush who framed it as fighting for ‘the rights and dignity’ of Muslim women (Bush, L., 2001). Bush was the first First Lady to deliver the Presidential Radio Address on 17/11/2001. In her speech she appropriated the voice of Afghan women, drawing a tenuous connection between the oppressive Taliban regime and the need for military intervention to oust them. Her specious reasoning didn’t offer any explanation as to why intervention was required in this specific context but not wherever else in the world similar human rights abuses may be found. Instead, ‘women and girls’ were weaponised to justify America’s particular desire for military action. The supposed aim was to ‘liberate’ Afghan women and also to protect ‘our mothers, our sisters and daughters’ from the terrorists who would seek to oppress us too. Abu-Lughod (2002) calls into question the stated aim in this case, arguing that there was a conflation between the ‘war on terror’ and the furthering of human rights. Instead of exploring historical and political reasons for the terror attacks, Abu-Lughod highlights that the hegemonic interpretation was through religious and cultural framing. This focus on culture as pathology obfuscates historical American interference, effectively dehistoricising the situation in Afghanistan. Concerningly, this approach which uses the plight of women as a pawn in neo-colonial ambitions to subdue and civilise unruly societies has long roots in colonial policies. Spivak (1994) summed this up as ‘white men are saving brown women from brown men’. Abu-Lughod (2002) references examples of such colonial feminism in Egypt and Algeria where lip service was tokenistically paid to the plight of women’s human rights and welfare. Sadly, whether historic or recent, such claims are simply imperialism posing as the defence of human rights. Ironically the human rights of the women who supposedly need saving are violated by the failure to meaningfully engage the women, hear their viewpoints or respond to actual rather than perceived needs. Abu-Lughod (2002) warns us to be wary of those who expound the need to defend human rights, all the while backed up by military troops. As Douzinas (2003) notes, the ‘just cause’ of human rights is held aloft as the singular universal rationale absolving the use of neo-colonially motivated military intervention. Referring to the invasion of Afghanistan, Brown (2004) observes how challenging it is to discern self-serving from sincere rhetoric regarding human rights. The risk is that the articulated motivation of advancing human rights insidiously constitutes a form of empire.

Empire and Global Inequalities in the Human Rights Regime

We have looked at the weaponisation and associated hypocrisies of the human rights regime and will now explore ways in which it can in fact be part of the systemic problems it seeks to address. In ‘Savages, Victims & Saviours’ Mutua (2001) convincingly argues that global inequalities and associated subordination are reinforced by the form and outworking of the current human rights regime. With the appearance of a noble cause, human rights can worryingly mirror and replicate the highly imbalanced, subjugating relationships between Western powers and the wider world (Mutua 2001). Tragically, such power imbalances favour those who supposedly ‘know better’ and seek to forcefully impose their way of life on others (ironic, given stated concerns about terrorists’ aims). Intervention of this kind is deemed necessary by imperialist powers borne from a belief that these ‘problematic’ cultures need to be managed (for their own good), all the while self-servingly shoring up global inequalities. Mutua (2001) highlights the Eurocentric origin of human rights, and, mindful of colonialism, just how crucial it is for universal concepts of human rights to come forth from those cultures which were subject to imperialism. After all, European worldviews can’t be treated as objective and absolute whilst all other cultures are marginalised. However, Mutua argues that the discourse of the human rights regime has systematically disregarded non-Western norms and related historical struggles for human dignity, treating them as outliers which didn’t fit the hegemonic narrative. Furthermore, he asserts that any such discussions about power and associated inequalities have mostly been sidelined within the human rights regime. Crucially, Mutua (2001) argues that excluding key voices from the human rights discourse sows division, ultimately leading to its downfall due to an inability to reach consensus. The solution Mutua proposes is one of recognisably grounding human rights in all cultures. A key part of this, he says, is ensuring the voices of non-Europeans are centred in the critique of the human rights regime. Nothing short of this multiculturalisation would enable human rights to be transformed from its imperialist origins and become truly universal (Mutua 2001). In order to effectively combat social inequalities, the hegemonic, hierarchical relationships between nations reinforced by the human rights movement need to be deconstructed and rebalanced (Mutua 2001). Such a transformation of the human rights regime would directly challenge and address the neo-colonial approach of attempting to ‘manage’ non-Western, non-liberal societies through imposition of human rights.

Economic Liberalism and ‘Market Friendly’ Motivations in Human Rights

We’ve looked at how the human rights regime can be fraught with the same global inequalities it seeks to address and now I will explore how the human rights agenda can obfuscate the imposition of economic liberalism. Evans (2005) observes that the global interconnectedness of international economies and politics makes what was once a purely domestic issue (the welfare of a states’ citizens), everyone’s business. These shifting boundaries require that nations affirm their commitment to human rights in order to engage with and gain from such global interactions. Failure to uphold human rights can, at the very least, lead to exclusion and sanctions. The globally accepted ‘norms’ of free trade, deregulation and privatisation are treated as correct, objective truth, with collective pressure to adopt these exerted by the international community. A rigid focus on individual rights can also lead to a priority for free trade and wealth accumulation rather than humanitarian issues, (as well as sidelining collectivist approaches to human rights) (Evans 2005). This reinforcement of capitalism can, in turn, generate further breaches of human rights. Brown (2004) also notes that the human rights regime does not disclose its political impacts which can lead to further subjugation as pursuit of individual rights often dovetails with liberal imperialism. Evans (2005) asserts that despite professing to advance human dignity, ‘market discipline’ creates a unique habitat in which selfishness and personal gain flourish. Such stated reasoning can mask other ‘market-friendly’ motivations, where human rights are imposed to bring a Western-centric order to unruly societies, thus achieving imperialist aims.

Conclusion

An understanding of historical context is crucial when examining the relationship between human rights, culture and empire. The origins, timing and authorship of the UDHR had a major bearing on the particular worldview represented therein and on its subsequent implementation worldwide. Cultural relativism highlights this, challenging the universality of human rights claims and their Western-centric nature, with the inherent risk of neo-colonial imposition of such values. However, cultural relativism and calls for tolerance of cultural practices also have their limitations. Both in terms of which nations are afforded flexibility in practice and when tolerance must give way to intervention. This approach to human rights has echoes of imperialism, predominantly favouring Western powers deemed to be higher in the cultural hierarchy.

The case of the United States’ defiance of the ICC lays bare the double standards for different nations as they alternately pursue and evade the agenda of human rights according to their imperial ambitions. The invasion of Afghanistan framed culture as pathology, neatly sidestepping historical meddling in Afghanistan, whilst using human rights as the singular moral justification for the neo-colonial intervention. Despite being used as an instrument of subjugation against them by Western powers, when non-Western nations do engage with human rights, inaccessibility and replication of global inequalities prevents meaningful progress. Furthermore, the guise of human rights may be used to mask a Western agenda of economic liberalism designed to civilise problematic societies for imperialist gain. Sadly, time and again, imposition of human rights has been used by Western powers to pursue imperial goals of dominating cultures deemed incompatible with liberal ideals.

As Hopgood (2013) notes, human rights have thus far failed to be universally adopted in part due to our interconnected global system revealing a multiplicity of interpretations of truth and norms. However, I disagree with Hopgood’s bleak overall assessment of the future of human rights and align with Mutua’s (2001) assessment that there is a way forward through greater inclusivity. Instead of treating other nations and cultures as objects of domination, Western powers should seek to genuinely collaborate multiculturally on the development of the human rights regime. Only in this way can human rights culture increase in popularity (Vieira de Mello 2013), with diversified ownership and the necessary resilience to uphold the dignity and wellbeing of all.

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